Quantum correlation between two particles and among three particles show nonclassic properties that can be used for providing secure transmission of information. In this paper, we propose two quantum key distribution schemes for quantum cryptographic network, which use the correlation properties of two and three particles. One is implemented by the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state, and another is implemented by the Bell states. These schemes need a trusted information center like that in the classic cryptography. The optimal efficiency of the proposed protocols are higher than that in the previous schemes.
I. Introduction
Since the first finding that quantum effects may protect privacy information transmitted in an open quantum channel by S.Wiesner [1] , and then by C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard [2] , a remarkable surge of interest in the international scientific and industrial community has propelled quantum cryptography into mainstream computer science and physics. Furthermore, quantum cryptography is becoming increasingly practical at a fast pace. Quantum cryptography is a field that combines quantum theory with information theory. The goal of this field is to use the law of physics to provide secure information exchange, in contrast to classical methods based on (unproven) complexity assumption. Current investigations of quantum cryptography involve three aspects: quantum key distriparticular, quantum key distribution became especially important due to technological advances which allow their implementation in laboratory. The first quantum key distribution prototype, working over a distance of 32 centimeters in 1989, was implemented by means of laser transmitting in free space [9] . Soon, experimental demonstrations by optical fibber were set up [10] . Now the transmission distance is extended to more than 30Km in the fiber [11] , and more than 205m in the free space [12] .
Quantum key distribution is defined as a procedure allowing legitimate two (multi-) users of communication channel to establish exact two (multi-) copies, one copy for each user, of a random and secret sequence of bits.
Quantum key distribution employs quantum phenomena such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the quanparties, who share no secret information initially, to communicate over an open channel and to establish between themselves a shared secret sequence of bits. The presented QKD protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attack, in that, as a matter of fundamental principle, the secret data can not be compromised unknowingly to the legitimate users of the channel. Several quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed, all these protocols can be classed into two kinds. i) The point-to-point (two parties) quantum key distribution (pQKD). Three main protocols of these are the BB84 protocol [3] , B92
protocol [4] and EPR protocol [5] [6] [7] . ii) The networking quantum key distribution (nQKD), e.g., the time-reserved EPR protocol [8] . The physical implementation may be refer to Townsend's works [13, 14] .
For the pQKD scheme, the first quantum key distribution scheme, i.e., the Bennett Brassard (BB84) scheme, was presented a decade ago. It is implemented by the four states {| ↑ , | ↓ , | ր , | ց }, where any of the two states {| ↑ , | ↓ } and any of the two states {| ր , | ց } are noncommuted, {| ↑ , | ↓ } may be any orthogonal states of two-dimensional Hilbert space. Its security is warranted by the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. In 1992, Bennett devised another protocol, i.e., the B92 protocol, which is based on the transmission of nonorthogonal quantum states. This protocol uses any two nonorthogonal states to implement the QKD. Its security relies on the no-cloning of unknown two-nonorthogonal states. A further elegant scheme has been proposed by Ekert, which is implemented by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [24] . It is called the EPR protocol which relies on the violation of the Bell inequalities [25] to provide the secret security. Consider the two-particle correlation, Bennett et al presented a modified version, in which the security is protocol, called time-reserved EPR protocol, in which users prestore quantum states in a trusted center, where their quantum states are preserved using quantum memories. The main procedures are as follows: users store quantum states in quantum memories, kept in a transmission center. Upon request from two users, the center uses two-bit gates to project the product state of two noncorrelated particles (one from each user) onto a fully entangled state. As a result, the two users can share a secret bit, which is unknown even to the center. The time-reserved EPR protocol was proposed to be used in a quantum cryptographic networking (QCN). The implementation of the time-reserved EPR scheme needs four particle for obtaining one qubit. One may ask that whether the nQKD scheme may be implemented by three or two particle or not? In this paper we propose several QKD protocols that use three or two particles to obtain one qubit. These protocols can also be used in networking QKD.
In this work we suggest two nQKD schemes. The suggested schemes need three parties: the trusted information center and two users, by conventional called Alice and Bob, here the center is trusted. One scheme is implemented by the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) [26] triplet state, we call this protocol as GHZ-nQKD protocol, in which the center's role is to measure his/her particle (from the GHZ triplet) by the random measurement like that in BB84 protocol, and tell Alice and Bob the measurement results. Another is implemented by the Bell states, we call it as Bell-nQKD protocol. This scheme needs the center to measure the two-particle entanglement system by the Bell operators or the linear combination of Bell operators before Alice's and Bob's measurement and send the users his/her results. By the center's assistance, the users can obtain the secret key, the cheating center as well review the two-particle maximally entangled states, the so-called Bell states and the three-particle maximally entangled states, the so-called GHZ triple state. In addition we investigate the correlation properties of the GHZ triplet and the Bell states. In Sec. III, we propose three protocols, which are implemented by the GHZ triplet. The efficiencies of these protocols are different, but they are more practical, especially the protocol 3. The securities of these protocols are analyzed. In Sec. IV, we propose two protocols implemented by the Bell states. The securities of these protocols are investigated. In Sec. V, we discuss the applications of our protocols in network QKD.
Conclusions are presented in Sec VI.
II. The Bell states and the GHZ triplet states
First we review the two and three particles entanglement states. In general, N-particle entanglement states may be written as [27] 
where u i stands for a binary variable u i ∈ {|z+ , |z− } and u c i = 1 − u i , |z+ and |z− denote the spin eigenstates, or equivalently the horizontal and vertical polarization eigenstates, or equivalently any two-level system. For N = 2 they reduce to the Bell states and N = 3 and N = 4 they represent the GHZ states. For a general N we shall calling them cat states. In this paper, we are interested in the case of N = 2 and N = 3, i.e., the Bell states and the GHZ triplet state.
Bell states
Eq.(1) reduces to the Bell states when N = 2
where the subscripts c, a, b denote the states for the information center and the two communicators Alice and Bob. These Bell states can be generated from a type-II parametric down-conversion crystal [28] . Define the x
the four Bell states can be rewritten as
As should be noted, for example, the |Ψ + states give correlated results in both the z and x bases, but the |Ψ − state give correlated results in the z basis, but anticorrelated results in the x basis. Summarizing these correlated or anticorrelated results of the Bell states From Table I it is clear that after the center has projected the two-particle entanglement system onto any of the four Bell states {Ψ 
One may get
We note that the set of states {Φ
following correlated or anticorrelated results 
GHZ triplet states
Eq.
(1) reduces to eight GHZ triplet states for N = 3.
In this paper we use the following state Suppose the center, Alice and Bob share one particle each from a three-particle entangled GHZ state, then the GHZ state may be represented by
where the first particle is that of the center, the second that of Alice, and the third that of Bob. Define the y
and using the x eigenstates defined in Eq.(6,7), the GHZ triplet state can be rewritten as
The above decomposition demonstrates the correlation among three particles. For example, in Eq. (20) if one particle is in the state |x+ and the second particle is in the state |x+ , the third particle must be in the state |x+ 
III. GHZ-nQKD protocols
GHZ states has already found a number of uses. They form the basis of a very stringent test of local realistic theories. It was also proposed that they can be used for cryptographic conferencing or for multiparticle generations of superdense coding [27] . In addition, related states can be used to reduce communication complexity. Recently, it was proposed that they can be used for quantum secret sharing and quantum information split [19] . In this paper,
we use the GHZ state to distribute quantum key between 6. Alice and Bob obtain the final key by using the data sifting, the error correction and the privacy amplification technologies.
In this protocol, we let the center firstly measures his particle from the GHZ triplet, and only measure it in the x direction. The center's results will be |x+ or |x− . After the center has finished the measurement, Alice and Bob particles, either in the x or y direction, but the efficiency is low by this way, because these results measured along y direction have no use in this protocol and a half particles will be discarded, the efficiency is only 12.5%. The center's measurement collapses the GHZ triplet state to be a two-particle system. The state of the two-particle entanglement is not determined, because they may be any of the states even in the absence of eavesdropping. For these reasons, our scheme needs to supplement some classical tools such as the privacy amplification, the error correction and the data sifting, so we use these technologies in our protocol.
The implementation of these supplemented classic tools are the same as in the previous documents [9] .
In quantum key distribution some qubits (henceforth l)
will be wasted because of the loss and the inexactitude of equipment, so in order to be left with a key of L qubits the center 1 should prepare L ′ > 2(L + l). In this case the efficiency is
This efficiency is larger than that of the time-reserved EPR protocol, which is
Protocol 2 1. The center measures his GHZ particle either in the 
Protocol 3 direction.
Alice and Bob send their measurement bases (x or y)
to the center, but not the qubit values.
3. The center randomly measures his particle according to Alice's and Bob's measurement bases. If both Alice and Bob measure their particle using the same measurement basis, e.g. x or y direction, the center measures his particle using the x measurement basis, otherwise, the center measures his particle using the y measurement basis.
The center announces his measurement results, which
is any of the four states {|x+ , |x− , |y+ , |y− }. 
B. security analysis
These presented schemes are secure against eavesdropping. Their securities are warranted by the correlation of the GHZ triplet. To see these in a sufficient way, we will consider several possible eavesdropping in the following.
The cheating center's attacks
The cheating center is impossible to know the quantum 
Intercept/resend attacks
Let us now consider the intercept/resend attack defined in [9] . Suppose that the eavesdropper, by convention denoted by Eve, has managed to get a hold of Alice and Bob's key, she then intercepts a communicator's (e.g. Alice) particle from the center and send another particle to Alice.
In this case, three particles of the center, Bob and the Eve construct a GHZ triplet. However, because the Alice, Bob and the center's particles are not the GHZ triplet, there are no correlated or anticorrelated result, Eve's interception will introduce error and can be detected by Alice and Bob when they check the eavesdropping.
The entanglement attacks
The entanglement attacks is no use in our protocol. To show that, Let us assume that the eavesdropper has been able to entangle an ancilla in state |A with the GHZ triplet state that Alice and Bob are using. The state describing the state of the GHZ triplet and the ancilla is
By using the x and y eigenstates and Eq. 
IV. Bell-nQKD protocols
The above schemes are efficient, however they need three particles. Can we implement the network QKD scheme only by using two particles? In this section we investigate the two-particle schemes. In the following we
show that one can also use the Bell states to implement the above quantum key distribution procedure.
A. protocol
In Sec. II, we see that the two particles of the Bell states or the linear combination of Bell states have correlation properties, they are demonstrated in table I and II.
These properties may be used in the QKD relied on a third party. Let us now show how to implement the quantum key distribution by Bell states.
Protocol 4
1. The center prepares a set of two-particle entanglement pairs and projects each pair onto any of the four Bell bases.
2. The center sends respectively Alice and Bob one of the two-particles entanglement and his measurement results.
3. Alice and Bob make respectively the random measurement on their particle, either in the x or z direction.
4. Alice and Bob check the eavesdropping by using the correlation of Bell states.
6. Alice and Bob obtain a sharing key by using the data sifting, the error correction and the privacy amplification technologies.
This scheme is similar to the time-reserved EPR protocol, but there are several important dissimilarities. i) The time-reserved EPR protocol uses four particle and two particles were prestored in a transmission center, where their quantum states are preserved using quantum memories.
Our scheme uses two particles and need not the quantum memories.
ii) The efficiency of the time-reserved EPR protocol is η ′ < 12.5%, but the efficiency of our protocol is
iii) The center only uses results of the singlet states and its correlation properties in the time-reserved EPR protocol, but the center uses all quantum states in our scheme.
We can also use the table II to design a nQKD protocol.
The protocol goes as follows
Protocol 5
1. The center prepares a set of two-particle entanglement pairs and projects each pair onto any of the four bases
4. Check the eavesdropping by using the correlation demonstrated in Table II 2) The methods for checking eavesdropping are different. According to the protocol 5, we see the efficiency is same as protocol 2:
B. security analysis identity by the quantum authentication technology [31] or the classic authentication scheme [32] . If the identity is correct, the center distributes GHZ particles or the two particles of Bell states to users u i and u j , then they use the proposed protocol to distribute the key between two users. Here the users u i and u j are arbitrarily chosen.
VI. conclusion
We have show that the quantum correlation between two particles and among three particles can be used for the quantum key distribution relying on a trusted information center. Two schemes are proposed. One scheme is implemented by using the GHZ triplet states, in which three protocols are proposed, these protocols use three particles to obtain one qubit, and have optimal efficiency, especially the protocol 3. The other is implemented by the Bell state, in which two protocols are proposed, these protocols use one Bell particle pairs to obtain one qubit.
In the process of quantum key distribution, the center play an important role, however, the center can not the men-in-middle attack, the presented schemes need the trusted information center, or the users can verify the communicators' identity (in fact all previous QKD protocols, e.g., BB84, B92 and EPR protocol need this requisition in practical application).
